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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-CLASS ACTIONS-STATE
TRUTH-IN-LENDING CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURT
Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, 59 F.R.D. 99 (1973).
Since 1972, when Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co.' held that a suit brought by Master Charge cardholders could
not be maintained as a class action, federal courts have regu-
larly denied class certification in suits brought under the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act.2  Notwithstanding this trend,3 Judge Bar-
tels of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York recently certified a class action in a suit brought under
the Act in Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons.4 In so doing, Judge
Bartels has served notice that Ratner and the cases that have followed
it have not foreclosed judicial debate on the subject of truth-in-lend-
ing class actions. 5
The Kristiansen case will clearly be a valuable precedent for
future truth-in-lending class plaintiffs as a decision that runs counter
to the prevailing case law against allowance of class actions under
the Act. It is perhaps more significant, however, for its application
1. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970).
At least 23 district court decisions have followed Ratner in denying class
actions in truth-in-lending suits. See Fischer, From Ratner to Qui Tam:
Truth-in-Lending Class Action Developments, 24 HASTiNGs LJ. 813, 833-34
(1973).
3. This trend has been most fully documented in Fischer, supra note 2,
and Hausmann, Class Actions Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 1 CLASS Ac-
TION REP. 26 (1972). See also Garwood, Class Action Limits and Case
Trends in Truth-in-Lending, 89 BANKING L.J. 803 (1972); Note, Class Actions
Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410 (1974).
4. 59 F.R.D. 99 (1973).
5. Another decision that has expressly rejected Ratner is Eovaldi v. First
Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. I1. 1972). In Eovaldi the court tentatively
allowed the class action on the condition that the plaintiffs amend their com-
plaint to sue only for actual damages and attorneys' fees and waive the $100
minimum recovery established by 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970). Apparently, the
huge liability that could result from class action treatment of even a minor
violation of the Act seemed to the court to violate substantive due process. In
the absence of such a waiver, therefore, Judge McMillen requested the parties
to brief the question of the constitutionality of the damage provisions of the
Act in a class action situation. The court pointed out that the lack of a rela-
tion between the statutory and actual damages might constitute deprivation of
the defendant's property without due process of law.
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of the doctrine of Hanna v. Plumer0 to rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In Hanna the Supreme Court held that where
state law called for use of one procedure and the Federal Rules
called for another, the federal rule was to be applied in cases based
upon diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The impact of this holding
upon state policy was demonstrated in Kristiansen, where the court
allowed a pendent claim under the New York state truth-in-lending
act7 to proceed as a class action, despite a clear state court decision
prohibiting such class suits.8 Judge Bartels held that in accordance
with Hanna, the procedural nature of the question of class main-
tainability overruled the policy considerations that underlay the state
court's prohibition.9
Plaintiff Helen Kristiansen brought this suit as a class action
against John Mullins & Sons, Inc., a retail furniture chain store lo-
cated in a New York City ghetto area.10 The plaintiff was one of a
large number"' of Mullins' customers who had purchased furniture
on installment sales contracts in which the credit terms were alleg-
edly not disclosed in accordance with federal and state law.' 2  De-
6. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
7. N.Y. Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw §§ 401-22
(McKinney 1969).
8. Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
9. 59 F.R.D. at 108-09.
10. It has been argued that Judge Bartels' deviation from the Ratner line
of cases can be explained by the special equities of the situation in Kristiansen.
Not only were lower-income groups affected by the defendant's alleged viola-
tions, but Mullins' unfair commercial practices had been widely publicized by
the New York news media and had been the subject of public hearings by the
New York City Department of Consumer Affairs. Schrag, Recent Develop-
nents in Truth-in-Lending, 2 CLASS AcrION REP. 65 (1973). However, there
is no indication in the opinion that these considerations influenced Judge Bar-
tels' decision.
11. The number of members in the class Kristiansen sought to represent
is not given in the opinion. According to the plaintiffs' brief, however, the
class consisted of "at least 1000 persons and quite possibly several times that
number." Brief for Plaintiff at 4, Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, 59
F.R.D. 99 (1973).
12. Specifically, the complaint alleged failures to disclose the following
credit information properly: (1) the finance charge as an annual percentage
rate computed in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1605 and 1606 (1970) and re-
quired to be disclosed by 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (7) (1970); (2) the sum of all
periodic payments or to denote that sum "total of payments" as required by 12
C.F.R. §§ 226.8(b)(3) and 226.8(c) (1973). The complaint also alleged the
defendant's failure to present the required information in a clear manner, with
all numerical amounts and percentages in at least 10-point type, .075-inch com-
puter type, elite-size typewritten numerals, or legible handwriting, as mandated
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fendant Mullins opposed the plaintiff's motion for an order certify-
ing the class and moved for dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Bartels ruled that the ac-
tion was a proper class suit under rule 23(b)(3) for both the federal
and the state claims and denied the motion to dismiss.
The first major issue addressed in Kristiansen was the propriety
of using the class action device to enforce a group claim under the
Federal Truth-in-Lending Act. At first reading, rule 23 appears to
apply to actions brought under the Act. Under rule 23 a class action
can only be maintained if all the requirements of 23(a) and those
of one subsection of 23(b) are met. Clearly, a suit alleging com-
mon, specific truth-in-lending violations suffered by a sizable class
seems to satisfy fully the rule 23(a) requirements of: (1) numerous
plaintiffs, (2) common questions of law or fact, (3) common claims
or defenses, and (4) fair and adequate representation. However,
the courts following the Ratner trend have encountered one major
obstacle to a finding that the requirements of rule 23(b)(3) have
been fulfilled-the Act's $100 minimum penalty. 13  A judgment of
by 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1973). Lastly, it
was alleged that the language required by 12 C.F.R. 99 226.8(b) and (c)
(1973) had not been included. 59 F.R.D. at 102.
The Federal Truth-in-Lending Act, on which the first, second, and third
causes of action were based, was passed by Congress for the purpose of foster-
ing competition among businesses that extend credit to consumers by ensuring
full disclosure of interest rates in a uniform fashion. The goal of the Act is
to enable consumers to "shop around" for the best credit terms and to prevent
the "uninformed use of credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). The Act, as imple.
mented by Federal Reserve Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.13 (1973), sets
forth a detailed set of requirements for the full disclosure of interest rates in
standardized form. It provides for civil liability for violations of the Act to
the extent of twice the amount of the finance charge, with a minimum recovery
of $100 and a maximum of $1,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970). The
Act further provides that a defendant found to be civilly liable under the Act
must also pay the attorneys' fees of the plaintiff and the costs of the action.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970).
The New York state act invoked by Kristiansen in her fourth, fifth, and
sixth causes of action incorporated the disclosure requirements of the Federal
Act by reference and provided for liability for violation in an amount equal
to the credit service charge imposed. N.Y. Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y.
PEgs. PROP. Law §§ 401-22 (McKinney 1969).
Because of the claims under both of these acts, the defendant urged dismis-
sal on the ground that recovery under both the federal and the state acts would
be duplicative. Judge Bartels met this argument by pointing out that it went
only to the amount of any ultimate recovery rather than to the viability of
the claims themselves and ruled that this matter should not be decided prema-
turely on a motion to dismiss. 59 F.R.D. at 110.
13. Note 12 supra. See, e.g., Linn v. Target Stores, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 469
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$100 for each of a large number of plaintiffs could spell financial
ruin for a defendant, and this threat to defendants has been the basis
of the controversy surrounding truth-in-lending class actions. 14
More than any other single factor, this possibility has prompted
courts to refuse to permit class actions under the Act.
In his seminal decision in Ratner, for example, Judge Frankel of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York refused to expose the defendant bank to the possibility of a
$13,000,000 judgment for violations in the monthly billing state-
ments of 130,000 Master Charge cardholders. 15 The particular vio-
lation of the Act involved was set out by Judge Frankel in his earlier
decision granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the
merits.1 6 The violation consisted of the bank's failure to include
in its billing statement the annual percentage rate of interest that
would be charged on credit items not paid for within 25 days after
(D. Minn. 1973); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Wilcox
v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D. Kan. 1972); Rogers v. Coburn Fin.
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
14. The possibility of financial ruin for the defendant has produced some
strange bedfellows. Potential defendants and their counsel understandably
dread the possibility of ruinous judgments against them. Davenport, Class
Suits Against Banks: The Lingering Specter, 89 BANr.IG L.J. 787, 788 (1972).
But also, many consumer advocates fear that the possibility of huge liabilities
arising from unrestricted truth-in-lending class actions may produce a judicial
backlash which would be counterproductive to their cause. Cf. Fischer, supra
note 2, at 813. It is noteworthy, however, that there are no reports of a truth-
in-lending class action ever having gone to trial on the merits. This fact may
be attributable to the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to use the threat of a class
action to force settlement.
The problem of inordinate recoveries may be eliminated, or at least re-
duced, by legislative action. On July 23, 1973, the Senate passed a resolution
that includes an amendment limiting recovery in a class action under the Act
to the lesser of $100,000 or 1 percent of the net worth of the defendant cor-
poration. S. Res. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CoNG. REc. S14,428 (daily
ed. July 23, 1973). An amendment recommended by the Federal Reserve
Board to change the maximum liability to the greater of $50,000 or 1 percent
of net worth was rejected by vote of the Senate. The congressional record of
debate on the bill includes a discussion of the practical effects upon class ac-
tions under the Act that might be created by the proposed amendments. 119
CONG. REc. S14,403-31 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
15. Judge Frankel wrote: "The proposed recovery of $100 each for some
130,000 class members would be a horrendous, possible annihilating punish-
ment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to the
defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable violation of the Truth-
in-Lending Act." 54 F.R.D. at 416.
16. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
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the billing. The bank argued unsuccessfully that the Act did not
require disclosure of any interest rate for the 25-day "free-ride" pe-
riod, since no interest began to accrue until after this period was
over.
In its decision on the merits, the Ratner court held that the
bank's omission constituted a violation of the Act. In the subsequent
ruling that disallowed the class action, however, the court character-
ized the violation as extremely. technical and debatable.) More-
over, the court held that the actual harm to the purported class re-
sulting from the violation was insignificant and did not justify im-
position of the large $13,000,000 liability. According to Ratner,
therefore, propriety of a truth-in-lending class action is to be decided
by weighing the amount of the potential liability, the debatability
and technicality of the violation, and the likelihood of actual harm.
The Kristiansen court, however, did not use this type of "bal-
ancing" approach. It did not view the possibility of a $100,000
judgment against Mullins as an obstacle -to allowing the class action
under the Act, even though such a liability might have proved fi-
nancially disastrous to the defendant. In concluding that the suit
could be maintained as a class action, the court first rejected the de-
fendant's contention that the terms of the Act indicated a legislative
intent to preclude truth-in-lending class actions.18 Mullins had
contended that the Act's award of a minimum recovery of $100 and
attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff provided sufficient incentive
for individual enforcement of the Act.' 9 The defendant argued that
class actions were inappropriate under the Act because these pro-
visions for enforcement by "private attorneys general" manifested
congressional intent to preclude enforcement by consumer class ac-
tions. 20 The court, however, found nothing in the language or legis-
lative history of the Act to justify this contention.21 On the con-
trary, the court reasoned that the use of the class action device not
only was consistent with the "private attorney general" concept, but
was an indispensable means for implementing it effectively.2 2 The
17. Note 15 supra.
18. Although no court has yet rejected a truth-in-lending class action
solely on the ground that it could not lie under the Act (Fischer, supra note
2, at 819), several decisions preceding Kristiansen considered this factor. See,
e.g., Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972);
Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972).






court reasoned that if class actions were not allowed, the recovery
available under the Act would provide insufficient incentive to in-
duce the number of individual suits necessary to ensure widespread,
scrupulous compliance with the Act. 23
Having thus decided that class actions were available under the
Act, the court addressed the question whether to allow the class ac-
tion under the factual situation of the particular case. It first found
that the four prerequisites of rule 23(a) had been met,2 4 and then
held that rule 23(b) had been complied with, in that the conditions
of subsection (3) were present.25 The court thus in short order
ruled that the federal claim should proceed as a class action.
Significantly, this conclusion was reached without any discussion
of the arguments relied upon by courts that have denied class actions
under the Act. The Ratner court and those that have followed its
lead2 6 have found that class actions were inappropriate in cases
23. Id. The court added that the complexity of the calculation of credit
charges in an installment contract also tends to discourage individual suits. Id.
at 104.
The notion that the recovery provided by the Act is insufficient to ensure
compliance with the Act is subscribed to by the Federal Reserve Board, which
is responsible for promulgating regulations for the administration of the Act.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). In a letter to the Consumer Credit Subcommittee
of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee introducing
amendments to the Truth-in-Lending Act (see note 14 supra), the Board wrote
that the threat of class action exposure "elevates a possible Truth in Lending
law suit from the ineffective 'nuisance' category to the type of suit which has
enough sting in it to insure that management will strive with diligence to
achieve compliance." 119 CoNG. REC. S14,420 (daily ed. July 23, 1973).
The opinion in Kristiansen does not make it clear whether Judge Bartels
believed that Congress had actually anticipated enforcement of the Act by class
actions or that Congress had mistakenly provided insufficient incentive for in-
dividual suits to ensure compliance with the Act.
24. 59 F.R.D. at 104. Rule 23(a) reads as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
25. 59 F.R.D. at 106. Rule 23(b) requires that the conditions of one of
three possible subsections be met. Subsection (b) (3), under which most truth-
in-lending class actions have been brought is met only if "[t]he court finds
that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predomi-
nate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy."
26. See notes 2, 3 supra.
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where immense liabilities, unrelated to actual harm, could result
from highly technical violations of the Act. These courts have
pointed to the requirement of rule 23(b)(3) that where the basis of
a class action is the predominance of common questions of law and
fact, the judge may certify the class only if it appears that the "class
action is superior -to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. '2 7  In turn, these courts have de-
fined "superiority" to include a measure of fairness, which is deemed
violated when inordinately large recoveries result from the minimum
liability provision of the Act.
There are various ways in which the Kristiansen court could have
countered this generally accepted, though questionable reasoning. It
could have argued, for example, that the possibility of a ruinous
judgment against the defendant is simply not a proper ground for
disallowing a class action under rule 23(b)(3). Although it is in-
disputable that a court is called upon to exercise its discretion in de-
ciding when a class action is a "superior" procedure in a given con-
troversy, the four factors that 23(b)(3) requires a court to examine
in determining the applicability of the rule2 8 have nothing to do with
the possible financial impact that allowance of the class might have
upon the defendant. Therefore, even though the phrasing of rule
23(b)(3) and the notes of the Advisory Committee29 make it clear
that the rule's list of relevant factors is not exhaustive, to look to the
financial impact of permitting the class action is to add a considera-
tion of a different nature from those set forth in the rule. Such an
addition opens an entirely new area of inquiry, which cannot be
justified by the language of rule 23(b)(3). Furthermore, even if
this inquiry were proper, it would reveal that courts frequently en-
force judgments that result in bankruptcies in areas ranging from
mortgage foreclosures to recoveries under the securities laws. 30
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
28. Rule 23(b) (3) lists four factors that must be weighed in making this
decision:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and na-
ture of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
29. The notes state, "Factors (A)-(D) are listed, non-exhaustively, as per-
tinent to the findings." 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966).




The argument that a court ought somehow to weigh the gravity
of the violation and the scope of the harm against the potential lia-
bility is not only unsupported by the text of rule 23, but is also with-
out any support in -the Truth-in-Lending Act itself. The Act makes
no distinction between minor technical violations, which may cause
slight harm, and substantial ones, which may gravely prejudice the
ability of consumers to make an informed choice of credit. On the
contrary, it can be argued that the very purpose of providing a $100
minimum recovery under the Act was to encourage suits for viola-
tions involving negligible, speculative, or unprovable damages. 31 Ar-
guably, therefore, recovery for a class should not be denied merely
because damage to its members is slight in proportion to the amount
of a possible judgment against the defendant. Courts that have re-
jected class actions under the Act because of the possibility of a
disproportionately large recovery have thus ignored the purpose of
Congress in providing for a $100 minimum recovery.
The significance of the problem of disproportionate recoveries
in truth-in-lending class actions is illustrated by the lengths to which
some courts have gone in order to avoid imposing severe judgments
in situations in which they felt the class suit should be maintained.
For example, in Eovaldi v. First National Bank32 the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois permitted a class action to pro-
ceed on the condition that the plaintiffs' attorneys amend their com-
plaint to waive the $100 minimum recovery and sue only for actual
damages and attorneys' fees.
Such a remarkable solution to what judges have viewed as the
problem of disproportionate recoveries demonstrates judicial sensi-
tivity to the potential plight of the defendant in a truth-in-lending
class suit. The question then becomes, why did the Kristiansen
court not respond in any way to this generally decisive issue? It
could have disposed of the Ratner rationale by showing that Ratner
was incorrect in viewing a disportionate recovery as an absolute bar
to class treatment. Alternatively, the court could have distinguished
the factual situation in Kristiansen and argued that even if the
Ratner result did have merit based on the peculiar facts of that
case, employing this approach would not require rejection of the
class under the facts of the instant case.33 In contrast to the Ratner
31. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 816.
32. 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
33. Judge Bartels did point out that "closed-end" contracts were involved
in Kristiansen, as distinguished from "open-end" contracts, which were at issue
in Ratner. In footnote two of his opinion he stated, "Open-end credit sales
19751
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situation, the alleged violations in Kristiansen were clear, and not
based on disputable technicalities.3 4 Additionally, the figure of
$100,000 in damages is quite small in comparison with the damages
of $13,000,000 involved in Ratner, and it may not even have rep-
resented a substantial sum in proportion to defendant's assets.35
But in order to have distinguished Ratner properly, the Kristian-
sen court would have been required to determine 'how to weigh the
various considerations that compelled disallowance of the class in
Ratner. The elements of disputability of the violation, size of the
class, and the likelihood of actual harm would have had to have
been measured in accordance with some standard. In Ratner such
a measurement was not necessary, since each of the elements was
present in an extreme form. Whether the failure of the bank to state
the annual percentage rate during the "free-ride" period constituted
a violation of the Act was a very close question, the 130,000 mem-
ber class was extraordinarily large, and the actual harm to the plain-
tiffs was very doubtful, since most of the cardholders probably knew
how much interest they would have to pay after the "free-ride" was
up.
But if any or all of these items had been less extreme, how
should the court have balanced them? If the violations had been
obvious, would the $13,000,000 judgment have then been appro-
priate? Or if there had been only a few cardholders, would the class
have been permissible? Clearly, fashioning a rule for an objective
measurement of the factors relevant ,under the Ratner approach is
difficult. It requires not only that each element 'be evaluated in-
dividually, 'but also that it be weighed against the other factors.
Such a process is very unlikely to -provide a uniform rule for deter-
minining the allowability of truth-in-lending class actions.
For this reason, the Kristiansen court would have been on firm
present more difficult and complex problems for class actions than closed-end
credit sales." 59 F.R.D. at 102 n.2. "Open-end" credit agreements are those,
best typified by the gasoline credit card, which involve repeated credit pur-
chases billed on a monthly basis, "Closed-end" credit transactions are those
in which a buyer takes immediate possession of the goods, which he pays for
on an installment basis. Open-end suits are typically brought on behalf of a
huge number of credit card holders alleging highly technical violations in their
monthly statements. Closed-end suits are likely to involve smaller classes of
less affluent consumers asserting more significant attempts to obscure interest
rates on the part of creditors.
34. See note 12 supra.
35. The size of the potential liability in Krisdansen is uncertain. It is at
least $100,000, but perhaps several times that amount. See note 11 supra.
[Vol. 25:404
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ground if it had issued a forthright rejection of the Ratner rationale.
Since it did not, there remains much doubt whether the court per-
mitted the class action because it felt the facts of the case did not
compel disallowance under the Ratner approach or because it be-
lieved that approach was wrong.
It is important to note that an express rejection of the Ratner
rationale would not have necessitated a holding that truth-in-lending
class actions should invariably be permitted. On the contrary, the
circumstances of an individual case might well give rise to sound rea-
sons for disallowing a class. For example, where the violation is so
strictly technical as to have caused no harm to the plaintiffs, it could
be argued that the court ought not burden itself and the defendant
with a class action. The precept that the law does not concern it-
self with trifles could properly be brought to bear in examining the
nature of the violation apart from the amount of the recovery.
For example, if a credit agreement presented an interest rate
properly in every respect except that it used 9-point type instead of
the 10-point type required by the Act,36 a court could find such
a violation to 'be de minimis. However, the size of the possible re-
covery should not be allowed to influence the court's judgment in
deciding whether such a violation is trifling. This decision ought to
be made independently, not through the process of balancing the
degree of harm against the financial interests of the defendant as
Ratner would require.
Indeed, Ratner itself provides excellent evidence of the distortion
of a court's perspective that can result from estimating the seriousness
of a truth-in-lending violation under the influence of class action
pressure. In its decision on the merits the Ratner court granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without difficulty. It re-
ferred to the defendant's arguments as "weak,"'37 "demonstrably
wrong," 38 and contrary to the "thrust of the Act."39 In its later rul-
ing on the class action, however, it characterized the defendant's
illegal activity as "at most a technical and debatable violation. '40
In all probability, the possibility of a $13,000,000 judgment modi-
fied the court's view of what had at one time seemed a substantial
and obvious violation. It is precisely this sort of influence that
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970).
37. 329 F. Supp. at 275.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 276.
40. 54 F.R.D. at 416.
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should not taint a court's evaluation of the significance of a truth-
in-lending violation, since the threat of a huge liability makes every
violation -appear to be a trifle.
A circumstance other than the nature of the violation that might
also call for the rejection of a truth-in-lending class action is the pres-
ence of improper solicitation of litigation. A number of courts have
refused to allow class actions under the Act where it appeared that
the plaintiffs' attorneys were motivated primarily by their own in-
terests in initiating the litigation.41  The extent to which attorneys
may benefit from antitrust class actions at the expense of those they
purport to represent has been explained in detail by William Simon. 42
When a defendant corporation is faced with even the slightest pos-
sibility of the certification of a class action that would result in a
huge liability, it generally is willing to settle out of court for a sum
which, though substantial, represents a fraction of the potential re-
covery. 43 In the course of settlement negotiations, it is often agreed
that the bulk of this sum will go to the fees of the plaintiffs' attorneys
with the remainder to be divided among the class members. The
plaintiffs' attorneys, therefore, receive a windfall, and the class mem-
bers get very little. Simon presented as an example of such a result
the settlement of a suit against the Playboy Club from which each
class member received bar chits good for three drinks, while counsel
for the class was awarded $275,000. 44
Such a result can likewise occur in truth-in-lending class actions.
When a claim involving a debatable violation of little or no conceiv-
able harm is asserted on behalf of an immense number of class mem-
bers, a court should be alert to the possibility that the interests of the
class members might well be sacrificed to those of their attorneys
in the course of settlement. Such a suit should be closely examined 45
and, when appropriate, disallowed for failure to fulfill the require-
41. E.g., Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Bu-
ford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
42. Simon, Class Actions: Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55
F.R.D. 375 (1972).
43. Id. at 389-90.
44. Id. at 378.
45. In Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
one of the reasons for denying a truth-in-lending class action was that the at-
trney for the class was also a member of it. The potential abuse of rule 23
invited by this situation prompted the warning that "[u]ntil otherwise directed
this court, for one, intends to carefully scrutinize every action in which plain-
tiffs seek monetary relief and wish to represent a class of similarly situated
persons. . . ." Id. at 1251.
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ment of rule 23(a)(4) that the representative parties fairly and ad-
equately protect the interests of the class. 46
In addition to the nature and extent of the violation and the
presence of improper solicitation of litigation, a third factor for court
consideration in deciding the propriety of a truth-in-lending class
action is the practical availability of enforcement by the Federal
Trade Commission, 'the primary enforcement agency under the
Act.47  Since the capacity of the agency -to supervise credit trans-
actions is finite, it has been held that class actions are most ap-
propriate as a secondary enforcement device to ensure that small
credit institutions not scrutinized by the FTC comply with the Act.4 8
Thus the "private attorney general" concept, implicit in consumer
class actions, takes up only where regulation by the FTC leaves off.
Therefore, in a suit brought on behalf of numerous plaintiffs against
a large corporation there is less justification for allowing the class,
since FTC action would be a more efficient means of enforcement
of the Act.
Perhaps the failure of the Kristiansen court to discusss the diffi-
culties associated with disproportionate recoveries can only be ex-
plained by reference to the attitude it expressly adopted toward
the class action device in the latter part of the decision. For as
will be shown below, in permitting class hearing of the pendent state
claim, the court held that the class action was strictly a procedural
tool, without substantive impact.49  Similarly, in deciding to allow
class treatment of the federal claim, the court looked only to pro-
cedural considerations. The method by which the court could most
fairly and efficiently adjudicate the claims of a large number of par-
ties was its sole concern,50 and it did not find it necessary to inquire
into matters beyond the express prerequisites of rule 23.
46. Failure to fulfill the requirement of rule 23 (a) (4) was one of the
grounds for denying the class action in Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D.
442 (D. Ariz. 1972), another truth-in-lending class action in which the plain-
tiffs' attorney was also a member of the rejected class.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1970).
48. Turoff v. Union Oil Co., 61 F.R.D. 51, 55 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
49. See text accompanying note 91 infra.
50. Curiously, in reaching the determination as to the relative efficiency
of the class action proceeding, Judge Bartels proceeded under an assumption that
was at odds with his own earlier conclusion. He had previously concluded that
the financial incentive was insufficient to encourage individual suits under the
Act. 59 F.R.D. at 103. Later in the same opinion, he apparently concluded
that the class action procedure was necessary in order to avoid the inefficiency
that could result from the litigation of a large number of individual claims.
Id. at 106. However, if class treatment were not allowed, and assuming the
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While cases such as Kristiansen and Ratner demonstrate the lack
of complete predictability in the federal court treatment of truth-in-
lending class actions, Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America51 left no
doubt that class actions would not be allowed in cases under New
York State truth-in-lending law. There, plaintiff Hall alleged that
printed retail installment contracts through which defendant Co-
burn had provided financing for carpet purchases failed to meet the
requirements of the New York Retail Installment Sales Act,5 2 the
forerunner of the present New York truth-in-lending law. The con-
tract forms had been prepared by Coburn and distributed to various
retail carpet sellers. The contracts of sale had thereafter been as-
signed by the sellers to Coburn. Hall alleged that the aggrieved
class consisted of all persons who had purchased merchandise by
means of these contracts.
Without reaching the merits of the case, the New York Court of
Appeals rejected the proposed class action. It stated: "[T]here
must be more of a common interest -than the fact that a number of
persons made a number of quite different and unrelated contracts
with a number of different and unrelated sellers using the same
written form which is claimed to be illegal." 53  However, this
correctness of the earlier conclusion that the Act offered insufficient incentive
for individual suits, it is probable that no more than a few members of the
rejected class would bother to sue individually. Thus, the class action device
would not be required in order to avoid inefficiency, since the few claims could
be handled efficiently by joinder of the parties. In effect, Judge Bartels' justifi-
cation for allowing the class action was that it solved the very problem it cre-
ated-the presence of a large number of claims. Other courts have denied
class actions in order to avoid the problem altogether. See cases listed in
Fischer, supra note 2.
This conflict between the court's earlier conclusion and later assumption
is a result of its failure to contend with a central issue inherent in consumer
class actions generally. A consumer class action brings before the court a
large number of parties who would be unlikely to bring suit on their own initi-
ative and, therefore, forces a court to decide whether or not to provide a mech-
anism for righting the wrongs against a class, the majority of the members of
which possibly do not know or care that they have been wronged. Of course,
courts may be faced with the necessity of making this decision less frequently in
the future, in view of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), that plaintiffs must bear the cost of notice
to the class in a rule 23(b)(3) action.
51. 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
52. N.Y. Retail Installment Sales Act ch. 599 [1957], N.Y. Laws 657,
as amended, N.Y. PERS. PROP. IAw §§ 401-14 (McKinney 1969). The suit
in Hall was initiated before July 1, 1969, the effective date of the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act and the state amendment which incorporated it into New
York law.
53. 26 N.Y.2d at 400, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
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procedural basis for the holding in Hall is not entirely convincing.
Arguably this case is just the sort in which class treatment would be
appropriate, since the use of a single printed contract form should
create identical issues of law in the claims of each of the class plain-
tiffs. Indeed, the court of appeals admitted that the cases dealing
with the requirements for a class action in New York were inconsis-
tent and that it was forced to rely upon an "overall appraisal" 54 of
them in deciding to reject the class. Clearly, given this inconsistent
case law, the court could have allowed the class without departing
from these earlier precedents.
It is probable, therefore, that the court's decision not to allow
the class action was actually determined by the policy considerations
set forth in the opinion. The court reasoned that class action suits
under the New York statute would unnecessarily harass finance com-
panies that underwrote credit sales. The real problem of retail credit
buying, it stated, was the -high cost of credit. This problem would
not be solved by allowing truth-in-lending class actions. Rather,
the court continued, the primary beneficiaries of such class suits
would be the attorneys who activated the litigation. 55
The federal court deciding Kristiansen was thus faced with a
clear state court holding that truth-in-lending class actions were in-
appropriate because they gave rise to harassment of credit institu-
tions and undesirable solicitation of litigation. The policy behind the
New York ruling was clear. Therefore, the question Judge Bartels
had to decide was whether the existence of this state policy required
disallowance of class treatment of Kristiansen's pendent state claim,
even though rule 23 permitted class treatment for the identical fed-
ral claim.5 6
The Krisdansen court concluded initially that analysis of this is-
sue should proceed on the same basis regardless of whether the court
was hearing a state claim based on pendent or on diversity jurisdic-
54. Id. at 401, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
55. Id. at 404, 259 N.E.2d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 286. See notes 41-
45 supra and accompanying text.
56. In footnote 14 of his opinion Judge Bartels disposed of the suggestion
that the court should avoid collision with state law by refraining from exer-
cising pendent jurisdiction altogether. 59 F.R.D. at 109 n.1. He noted that
the complaint in Hall was filed in the state court before the effective date of
the federal and amended state truth-in-lending acts, and thus before any basis
for pendent jurisdiction existed. However, this fact seems irrelevant since the
Hall statements of policies against harassment of credit institutions and en-
couragement of solicitation of litigation should apply equally to the present
state act.
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tion57 and then proceeded to apply its interpretation of -the doctrine
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins5" and its progeny. In Erie the
Supreme Court reversed the traditional rule of Swift v. Tyson59 by
holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the sub-
stantive law of the state in which it sits, as reflected not only in the
state's statutes but also in its judicial decisions. The court based
this conclusion on three different grounds. First, it held that the fed-
eral courts had no power to declare rules of substantive law beyond
that granted specifically by -the Constitution.60  Therefore, the fed-
eral courts were not to create their own federal common law but
rather, state substantive law had to be applied. Secondly, the Court
construed the word "laws" in the Rules of Decision Act, 61 which
was passed by the Congress in 1789 to establish a rule for the choice
of law in diversity actions, to mean both judicial and statutory law.62
Finally, the Court looked to policy considerations underlying the
Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act and concluded that un-
fairness to diversity defendants would result -from a declaration and
application of federal common law, since a plaintiff could choose
the forum that offered law most favorable to his claim. 63
Erie clearly established that all state substantive law had to be
applied in diversity actions in federal courts. The more difficult
question, which Erie left unanswered, was: "What is substantive law
57. The court cited Briskin v. Clickman, 267 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), and Mintz v. Allen, 254 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), to support
this conclusion. Of course, Judge Bartels could have avoided the issue of al-
lowability of the class action in the pendent claim by exercising his discretion
to refuse to hear it at all. Fundamental to the concept of pendent jurisdiction
is the idea that needless decisions of state law should be avoided as a matter
of comity. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 333 U.S. 715, 728 (1965). By
hearing the pendent claim in Kristiansen, the court arguably generated needless
friction between federal and state law, and it thus ought to have denied hearing
of the pendent claim altogether. Nevertheless, Judge Bartels found it proper
to hear the state claim and refused to "emasculate" the pendent jurisdiction
of the court by limiting the state cause of action to individual treatment for
the sake of comity. 50 F.R.D. at 100, 110.
58. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
59. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
60. 304 U.S. at 78.
61. Originally promulgated as § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, the Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states, ex-
cept where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
62. 304 U.S. at 72-73.
63. Id, at 74-77,
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and what is procedural?" The importance and difficulty of answer-
ing this question became increasingly clear as the series of Supreme
Court decisions following Erie threatened the then recently-attained
uniformity of procedure in the federal courts under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.64 For under the test that the Court was
developing, any rule that could result in a change in the outcome of
the case at hand was deemed to 'be substantive.0 5 Since Erie re-
quired the application of state substantive law almost every Federal
Rule seemed to be subject to displacement in diversity actions by its
state counterpart. To resolve this problem, the Supreme Court in
1965 decided Hanna v. Plumer,66 the case relied upon by the
Kristiansen court in deciding to allow class hearing of the pendent
claim.
Hanna involved a negligence action brought in a federal district
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The summons and
complaint were delivered to the wife of the defendant executor, a
method permitted by rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In his answer, the defendant urged that the suit could
not be maintained, since service of process had been insufficient
under a state statute that required in-hand service upon an exe-
cutor. 67 The district court held for the defendant, and the court of
appeals, affirming, concluded that service of process was a matter
of substantive law.08 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
state statute could not overcome the federal rule.
The majority opinion in Hanna, written by Chief Justice War-
ren, can be divided into two parts. The first part discussed the ap-
plication of the traditional Erie doctrine to the facts of Hanna, apart
from the significance of the fact that one of the federal rules was in-
volved. The second part examined the status of the Federal Rules
vis-a-vis state law and the significance of the Enabling Act, under
which the Rules were promulgated.69
64. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. '530 (1949);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
65. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
66. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
67. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (Supp. 1972).
68. Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1964). The court of appeals
reasoned that actual record notice appeared as much a substantive state re-
quirement as the state bond-posting requirement that the Supreme Court had
held must be complied with in diversity actions in the federal courts. Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see text accompanying note
85 infra.
69. The Enabling Act provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
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In the first part of its opinion, the majority held that traditional
Erie analysis would have permitted application of the federal rule
in the case.70  The Court looked behind the "outcome determina-
tive" test for the considerations that underlay Erie and found that
Erie was based on the twin considerations of avoidance of "inequit-
able administration of the laws"71 and "forum shopping."72  The
Court reasoned that the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act
required federal courts to be sensitive to considerations of fairness to
the defendant in a diversity action. Since it would be unfair -to sub-
ject a defendant to different substantive laws than those by which
he would be bound in the courts of his state, a federal rule that
materially altered the "character or result" 73 of a suit would have
to give way to state law. Likewise, a -federal rule could not be ap-
plied if it would lead to "forum shopping" by giving an out-of-state
plaintiff the opportunity to select the court, federal or state, that
would be more favorable to his claim.
In accordance with this reasoning, the Court concluded that per-
mitting service of process by other than the in-hand method in
Hanna would not have given rise to the sort of "inequitable adminis-
tration of the laws"7 4 with which Erie was concerned, because it
would not alter the "character or result" of -the litigation. That is,
the defendant would not be subjected to any heavier burden in fed-
eral court than he would face in state court. Furthermore, the
Court stated that the absence of a requirement of in-hand service in
rule 4(d)(1) would probably have little effect on the plaintiffs
choice of forum.75 Therefore, the Court ruled that even under tra-
ditional Erie doctrine there was no obstacle to application of the Fed-
eral Rule.
In the second part of the opinion -the Court set forth what has
emerged as the Hanna doctrine, while the alternative holding of the
first part of the opinion has been overshadowed. 76 Simply stated,
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeal of
the United States in civil actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right ....
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
70. 380 U.S. at 466.
71. Id. at 468.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 467.
74. Id. at 468.
75. Id. at 469.




the doctrine holds that where a Federal Rule dictates the use of one
procedure and state law dictates another, the Federal Rule must pre-
vail. 77  This results from the reasoning that since a given federal
rule cannot be both procedural and substantive, and since Congress
believed that the inclusion of the rule in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure violated neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor the Con-
stitution, 78 then the rule is prima facie procedural in all contexts.
Since Erie allows the use of federal procedure, the Federal Rule
must apply. According to this syllogism, a conflicting state rule can
be disregarded unless the Federal Rule in effect enacts substantive
law without any express grant of power in the Constitution to do so
or unless the Rule violates the command of the Enabling Act that no
Rule shall "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . .."79
Applying this reasoning to the specific factual situation of Hanna,
the Court held that it was within the power of Congress to enact
rule 4(d)(1) as a necessary and proper exercise of its power to es-
tablish the federal court system under Article M of the Constitu-
tion.80  This was true even though it could be argued that
rule 4(d)(1) affected state substantive law, since the power of Con-
gress extended to regulation of matters "which, though falling within
the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally
capable of classifications as either."8' As to rule 4(d)(1)'s propriety
under the Enabling Act, the Court simply stated that the rule was
procedural, since it merely constituted a "mode of enforcing state-
created rights."82
The majority's analysis of Hanna came under immediate attack
from Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion. Justice Harlan char-
acterized the court's rule as an "arguably procedural, ergo constitu-
tional test,"'8 3 which gave an unwarranted presumption of validity to
the Federal Rules. He argued that the effect of a given rule on
state policy should be the starting point in examining its validity.
77. Id.
78. In regard to the constitutional issue, Chief Justice Warren wrote in
Hanna: "We are reminded by the Erie opinion that neither Congress nor the
federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal
courts, fashion such rules which are not supported by a grant of federal author-
ity contained in Article I or some other section of the Constitution ...
380 U.S. at 471.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
80. 380 U.S. at 472.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 473.
83. Id. at 476.
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Approaching the issue of choice of law in diversity actions as one
governed by the Constitution, he argued that if the application of a
federal rule "would substantially affect those primary decisions re-
specting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to
state regulation, '8 4 then the state rule would have to prevail.
Justice Harlan's broad rule might have been obscure indeed had
he not illustrated it with examples of how his proposal would have
applied to the previous cases in the Erie line. The example that is
relevant to this discussion is Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp.8 5 In that case the Supreme Court had held that in a class
action under old rule 2386 brought in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction, a New Jersey statute requiring the plaintiff to post a
bond in all stockholders' derivative actions had to be given effect.
In his Hanna opinion, Justice Harlan viewed the statute involved in
Cohen as designed to inhibit the initiation of "strike suits" and,
since it could be expected to accomplish this result, the statute af-
fected "private primary activity."87 Thus, application of the Federal
Rule, which did not require the posting of a bond in such suits,88
would have affected a "primary decision respecting human con-
duct"89 by vitiating the state policy behind the statute. For this
reason, Justice Harlan concluded that the Court had properly ap-
plied the state statute in Cohen by not allowing the suit to proceed
as it would have under the Federal Rule.
At the time of Kristiansen, the Hanna decision, with its two ra-
tionales in the majority opinion and its persuasive concurring opin-
ion by Justice Harlan, constituted the controlling precedent on the
question of the allowability of the class action on the pendent state
claim. The Kristiansen court held that Hanna required certification
of the class action on the pendent claim under rule 23, in spite of the
contrary state policy set forth in Hall. In reaching this decision, the
Kristiansen court looked initially to the second part of the Hanna
majority opinion. It held that under the circumstances of the case
rule 23 was one of those matters which could be rationally classified
84. Id. at 475 (footnote omitted).
85. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
86. The class action procedures set forth in old rule 23 were completely
revised in 1966. 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
87. 380 U.S. at 477.
88. The Supreme Court in Cohen held that since rule 23 established the
requirements for a stockholders' derivative action without mentioning the post-
ing of a bond, there was no conflict with the New Jersey statute. 337 U.S.
at 556. But see text accompanying note 107 infra.
89. 380 U.S. at 475.
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as substantive or procedural.90 Since its presence in the Federal
Rules made the rule presumptively procedural under Hanna, the state
ruling against class actions could be ignored.91
Perhaps because it did not feel comfortable with this simplistic
argument, the Kristiansen court next turned to Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion for additional support. Rather than looking to see
if the rule in Hall was based on any discernible state policy, how-
ever, the Court questioned whether application of rule 23 in the case
would infringe any substantive right of the defendant.92 It reasoned
that a truth-in-lending defendant could not be said to have a substan-
tive right to be exempt from class actions. 93 Therefore, it concluded,
the rule enunciated in Hall did not protect any substantive right and
thus did not constitute a "primary decision respecting human con-
duct," which Justice Harlan believed could not be overcome by
one of the Federal Rules.94
Although the way in which the Kristiansen court used Hanna
left much to be desired, it is at the outset hard to criticize it for the
way it mechanically applied the majority opinion. Indeed, the
Kristiansen court interpreted the majority opinion exactly as Justice
Harlan did, 95 reducing its reasoning to "if it is in the Rules, it must
be procedural." A more careful examination of the majority opin-
ion in Hanna, considering both its first and second rationales, how-
ever, would have led to a different result in Kristiansen.
It has been argued persuasively that the first part of the opinion
of the Court in Hanna, the part which discussed traditional Erie
doctrine, is completely irrelevant whenever the applicability of one
of the Federal Rules is in issue.90 But if this were true, it would be
difficult to explain why the Court devoted so much of its opinion
to discussing the propriety of applying rule 4(d)(1) in the light of
the policy considerations underlying Erie. Furthermore, the Court
stated in the last paragraph of its opinion that "a court, in measuring
a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act
and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to
which the Rule makes the character and result of the litigation stray
90. 59 F.R.D. at 108.
91. Id. at 108-09.
92. Id. at 109.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 109.
95. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
96. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 K-Iv. L. REy. 693, 738
(1974).
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from the course it would follow in state courts. ... , This state-
ment is a clear reference to the first part of the opinion, which dealt
with the twin problems of altering the "character or result" of litiga-
tion brought in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction and
"forum shopping." The Hanna majority must have meant that a
case could arise in which -an examination of these considerations
would argue for not applying the Federal Rule. Kristiansen was
just such a case.
First, allowance of the class action in Kristiansen apparently re-
sulted in inequitable administration of the laws because it subjected
the defendant to a much heavier litigation burden than in an indi-
vidual suit in a New York state court. Moreover, application of
rule 23 significantly altered the "character" of the suit in the sense
that it placed substantial additional burdens on the defendant in pre-
paring for trial, greatly increased the size of the potential damage
recovery, and created the possibility of spawning such evils as lit-
gative harassment and solicitation of litigation. In Kristiansen, there-
fore, the alteration of the character of the suit, at least with respect
to the pendent claim, -gave rise to just the sort of inequity contem-
plated by the Hanna analysis of Erie.
Secondly, the allowability of a class action under truth-in-lending
laws in a federal court would plainly lead to "forum shopping."
Since Hall foreclosed the possibility of bringing a truth-in-lending
class action in New York State court, consumers seeking redress for
their class would naturally go to federal court, where class actions
were available. On those grounds -again, traditional Erie doctrine
would have called for disallowance of class treatment for the pend-
ent claim.
The effect of rule 23 on state law in Kristiansen was much
greater than that of rule 4(d)(1) in Hanna. In Hanna the Court
was able to state that it would have applied rule 4(d)(1) even if
the overriding force given to the Federal Rules in the second part
of its opinion was not a factor.98 This could not have been con-
tended in Kristiansen, since the circumstances of the case called for
rejection of the Federal Rule under a straight Erie analysis. Had
the Hanna court been faced with the Kistiansen situation, it would
have been forced to decide whether to follow Erie and apply state
law in place of the Federal Rule or whether to hold explicitly that
the preferred status of the Federal Rules gave rise to an exception
to the Erie doctrine.
97. 380 U.S. at 473.
98. Id. at 466.
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The Kristiansen court apparently interpreted Hanna to have
adopted the latter view, since it considered only the second part of
the majority opinion. But even its application of this portion of
Hanna was incorrect. For the Kristiansen court, as did Justice
Harlan, failed to recognize that inclusion of a rule in the Federal
Rules made it only "prima facie"99 procedural. Hanna left open
the question of when this presumption of a Federal Rule's conform-
ity with the Constitution and the Enabling Act could be rebutted.
Again, Kristiansen arguably presents such circumstances.
According to -the Hanna doctrine even one of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure would have to yield to state law if its substantive
effect went beyond the constitutional grant of power to the federal
government or violated the constraints of the Enabling Act. Clearly
there is no constitutional problem in Kristiansen, since application of
rule 23 to the New York truth-in-lending laws would not result in
any exercise of federal power beyond that used by Congress in pro-
viding for class actions under the Truth-in-Lending Act. 00 The
Enabling Act, however, does represent an obstacle to a class hear-
ing of the pendent claim in Kristiansen, since use of rule 23 would
nullify the state substantive law set forth in Hall.
The Kristiansen court, in the course of its discussion of Justice
Harlan's opinion in Hanna, ruled that use of the Federal Rule would
not infringe the rights of the defendant, since it had no right to
be immune from class actions. 101 In so ruling, however, the court
ignored the state policy considerations that underlay Hall: the need
to prevent both harassment of credit institutions and improper so-
licitation of litigation. s02 Since choice of the Federal Rule vitiated
99. Id. at 471.
100. It has been asserted that the Constitution is functionally irrelevant in
all cases covered by the Enabling Act, since the Constitution does not establish
a "state enclave" model but merely requires the federal government to act
within the scope of its enumerated powers. Because these pow6rs are so broad,
the argument continues, the Enabling Act imposes a much stricter limitation
than does the Constitution. Ely, supra note 96, at 706 & n.77.
101. 59 F.R.D. at 109.
102. In defense of Judge Bartels' opinion it can be argued that the discus-
sion of policy considerations set forth in Hall could actually be disregarded
because they constituted mere dictum, while the narrow ground for rejection
of the class suit was the insufficient showing of common interest among the
members of the class. See text accompanying note 53 supra. However, in
viewing Hall as standing for the broader proposition that class actions were
inappropriate in state truth-in-lending cases, Judge Bartels correctly understood
that the real reasons for disallowing the class were those reflected in the dic-
tua, and that the narrow procedural grounds for the dismissal were only cam-
ouflage for the substantive policies underlying the decision.
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these policy considerations, it modified the New York substantive law
and thereby violated the Enabling Act.
Defining the word "substantive" as used in the Enabling Act in
terms of state policy is not novel. It has been argued by Professor
Ely that a procedural rule is "one designed to make the process of
litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of dis-
putes,"' 03 whereas a substantive rule is one established for other
reasons.' 04 According to this definition, the rule of Hall must be
classified as substantive, since it sacrifices the fairness and efficiency
a class action is supposed to provide in order to effect more important
goals of state policy.
The importance of state policy to the choice of law in diversity
cases was emphasized by Justice Harlan in his discussion of the
Cohen case in Hanna. Since Cohen was apparently not overruled
by Hanna, the Kristiansen court ought to have considered the Cohen
treatment of state policy because of the similarity of the circum-
stances of the two cases. As Justice Harlan noted in his opinion in
Hanna, the bond requirement for stockholders' suits involved in
Cohen reflected a strong New Jersey state policy against "strike suits"
and was designed to have an impact on the "private primary ac-
tivity" of initiating frivolous suits.' 05 In much the same way, the
Hall decision ought to be viewed as expressing a state policy against
the use of harassing class suits under 'the Retail Installment Sales
Act.
The Hall ruling was obviously intended to control private liti-
gation against credit institutions, just as the statute in Cohen was
meant to control shareholder suits. To be sure, the methods of im-
plementing these policies are different. New Jersey's bond require-
ment affords shareholders some chance to sue derivatively where
they can obtain the required sum, whereas New York's blanket pro-
hibition eliminates all state truth-in-lending class actions. However,
given the difficulty of raising a bond, the result under both laws
could be much the same. Yet in Cohen the state policy was rec-
ognized and given effect while in Kristiansen it was overriden. 1°6
103. Ely, supra note 96, at 724.
104. Id. at 725.
105. 380 U.S. at 477.
106. It is significant that in Mintz v. Allen, 254 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), cited by Judge Bartels merely as authority for the proposition that Erie
applies equally to pendent and diversity jurisdiction, the court held that, in ac-
cordance with Cohen, state bond requirements in a stockholders' suit should
be enforced by the federal courts in handling pendent claims. The Kristiansen
court, however, failed to mention this aspect of Mintz.
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Arguably, Cohen can be distinguished from Kristiansen in that
in the former there was no direct collision between federal and state
law, since there was no express federal policy against the require-
ment of a bond in stockholders' suits.' 0 7 In the latter case there was a
clear conflict between the state position on the allowability of truth-
in-lending class actions and that of Judge Bartels. Therefore, the
result in Kristiansen could be explained by arguing that the presence
of a policy in favor of class actions was of greater weight than the
absence of a policy against the bond requirement. However, the
absence of a bond requirement in the Federal Rules was tantamount
to an express statement of a policy against limiting access to the fed-
eral courts. In both Cohen and Kristiansen, therefore, the state laws
represented obstacles to the course the litigation would have taken
in the federal courts were it not for the existence of the state rules.
The former case permitted the state rule to alter that course; the
latter did not.
This disparate treatment of state policy may have arisen from
the circumstance that in Kristiansen the pertinent state policy was
set forth in a judicial decision and not in a statute, as it was in
Cohen. The Kristiansen court might well have reacted differently
if it had been faced with a statute stating -that to protect credit in-
stitutions from undue harassment and to discourage improper so-
licitation of litigation no class action could be maintained under the
state truth-in-lending laws. Such a definitive statement of policy
might have carried the force of the statute requiring the posting of a
bond in stockholders' derivative actions. If Judge Bartels had
been confronted with such a statute, he might well have felt com-
pelled to disallow the state class action in Kristiansen. Such a plain
legislative declaration of policy would have been difficult to ignore
and might have appeared more "substantive" if printed among the
other provisions of the New York act. If it is true, however, that
a legislative expression of state policy would have carried more
weight in a federal court than a judicial decision of a state court,
then the original issue of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, statutory
law versus decisional law, once again appears to exist. This issue
was clearly settled in Erie and should not have affected the result in
Kristiansen.
In summary, the decision of the Kristiansen court to permit class
hearing of the federal cause of action under rule 23 made it neces-
sary for the court to decide whether the pendent claim should also
107. See note 88 supra.
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proceed as a class suit. Traditional Erie doctrine apparently re-
quired rejection of the class, because its allowance would materially
alter the character of the suit. Moreover, rule 23, as applied in
Kristiansen, violated -the Enabling Act, which was designed to preserve
such state substantive law as that reflected in Hall. Especially since
the propriety of class hearing of the federal claim was debatable,
the court should have refused the class action on the pendent state
claim.
Louis RoRiMER
